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Acting Out Against Gender Discrimination:
The Effects of Different Social Identities
Mindi D. Foster
University of North Dakota

Abstract: Self-categorization theory suggests that when a social identity is salient, group-oriented
behavior will ensue. Thus, women should be likely to act out against gender discrimination when their
social identity as women is salient. However, self-categorization theory has typically defined a social
identity along stereotypes, which may serve instead to maintain the status quo. Two studies therefore
examined the effects of two different social identities on taking action against discrimination.
Participants were female students (Anglo American (93%), African American (2%), Native American (2%),
Hispanic (1%), Asian American (1%) and other (1%)). Study 1 examined a structural model and Study 2
examined the causal relationships, both hypothesizing that a social identity based on stereotypes would
be associated with less collective action than a social identity based on social experiences. The hypothesis
was supported, and implications for expanding definitions of social identities were discussed.

Consider a young woman who has just been told by her professor that she should apply to the nursing
program in college rather than medical school because women are better suited to that discipline. Will
she act out against this discriminatory remark? Will she do so for her own benefit, or will she take
collective action, namely act to benefit the group of women? One of the underlying assumptions of
most theories of intergroup relations, is that in order for collective action to occur, one’s social identity
must be salient. For example, relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966) suggests
that collective action is more likely when individuals’ perceptions of group deprivation are salient, rather
than perceptions of personal discrimination. The five stage model of intergroup relations (Taylor &
McKirnan, 1984) suggests that collective action will occur after collective consciousness-raising whereby
individual group members must recognize that events such as a lack of mobility in status are due to their
group membership rather than individual characteristics. Social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and selfcategorization theories (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) suggest that the more an
individual thinks of him/herself as a group member versus a unique individual, the more likely grouporiented behaviors will occur.
Yet while an individual may have a salient social identity, collective actions do not appear to be
common. Research suggests that despite recognizing that their social group may be disadvantaged,
individual actions are the preferred response (e.g., Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright, Taylor,
Moghaddam, 1990) and when collective actions are taken, their incidence is low (e.g., Foster &

Matheson, 1995, 1998). Thus, while a salient social identity is likely to be a necessary condition for
collective action to occur, it does not appear to be sufficient.
This may in part be due to how researchers have defined a social identity. One of the most explicit
articulations of how a salient social identity is defined is self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987).
When a social self-categorization is salient, it is reflected by a particular pattern of perceptions referred
to as a high “meta-contrast ratio.” A meta-contrast ratio is defined as the ratio of the perceived
differences between members of one category and another, to the perceived differences among
members within one category (Turner et al., 1987). The meta-contrast ratio is high if “between group
differences” are perceived to be greater than “within group differences.” For example, a woman whose
self-categorization as a woman is salient will perceive the differences between men and women to be
larger than differences among women.
Typically, a meta-contrast ratio has been operationally defined as occurring along the “stereotypical
dimensions which define the relevant ingroup membership” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Stereotyped
traits are commonly used to reflect the dimensions along which to measure the meta-contrast ratio
because of their presumed relevance to definitions of the group (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lee, 1992; Oakes
& Turner, 1990; Stephan, 1977; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989; Turner, Oakes, Haslam,
& McGarty, 1994). For example, a woman’s social self-categorization is said to be salient when she
perceives differences between men and women to be larger than differences among women in terms of
their tendency to be “emotional” or “sensitive.” Thus, minority group members’ social identities are
often operationally defined along intrinsic, stereotyped traits.
However, if minority group members are defining their group in terms of intrinsic personality
characteristics, the qualitative nature of that social identity may not be conducive to taking collective
action. For example, if the young woman who has been told to enter nursing rather than medical school
defines women along stereotyped traits such as sensitive (e.g., “women are sensitive; that makes them
good nurses”), she might then internalize her professor’s comments. She may reason that as a woman,
her personality is better suited to nursing than to medical school. Her professor’s comments would be
therefore be defined as reflecting an accurate interpretation of her character (“I don’t have the right
type of personality for medical school”). Indeed, past research has found that women’s endorsement of
traditional stereotypes is related to making internal attributions for their own failures (Neto, 1995) and
for their experiences of sexual harassment (Jensen & Gutek, 1982). Consequently, collective action is not
a likely response for what is perceived to be an individual problem.
In contrast, group consciousness (Bartky, 1977, Bowles & Duelli Klein, 1983; Carey, 1980; Dreifus, 1973,
Stanley & Wise, 1983; Wilkinson & Schneider, 1990) and new social movement theories (Friedman &
McAdam, 1992; Gamson, 1992) define the social self as being more externally based. In the feminist
consciousness-raising groups of the 1970s, women were encouraged to share their experiences and in
so doing they discussed various issues such as abuse from husbands, rape and verbal assaults, the
meanings of femininity and sexuality, lack of work, lack of respect at work, being secretaries, mothers,
and husbands’ maids and cooks. As women shared their experiences it became more apparent that
many other women but not men had encountered these incidents and that the individual woman was

“not the only one.” In essence, they were recognizing greater differences between men and women
than among women themselves. Thus, these groups were promoting the recognition of a high metacontrast ratio along social experiences that stemmed from factors outside of the individual.
By defining women along shared social experiences rather than intrinsic traits, a qualitatively different
social identity that is more conducive to taking collective action may be experienced. Consider again the
woman who is told by her professor that she should consider nursing rather than medical school. By
defining women in terms of shared social experiences (e.g., “women as a group are given limited
educational opportunities”) she may externalize her professor’s comments, reasoning that her
professor’s advice was an example of how women are discriminated against in the education system, as
opposed to being an accurate reflection of her “sensitive personality.” Consequently, collective action
may be a more likely response, given the situation is defined to be a function of something external to
herself, namely the system. Thus, the examination of alternative theories of social identity (group
consciousness) suggests that while a social identity may be salient, it may not necessarily lead to
collective action. It may be that how the social self is defined (along external social experiences rather
than internal stereotyped traits) can provide a greater understanding of when collective action by
minority group members may occur.
Two studies were therefore designed to examine how different social identities would affect responses
to discrimination. Study 1 examined how social identities defined along stereotypes and social
experiences would be related to participation in collective action. Study 2 examined the causal impact of
these social identities on varied responses to discrimination, namely accepting discrimination, taking
individual and collective action. It was expected that women with a salient social identity defined along
social experiences would respond to discrimination with more collective action than women with a
salient social identity defined along stereotypes.

STUDY 1

Rationale
According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), a group’s social identity is defined by
stereotypical dimensions that are relevant to that group. However, members of the same group often
promote different definitions of their group. Some women identify with traditional stereotypes, while
others promote definitions of their group that reflect the shared social experiences of women. While
both social identity definitions may be salient, they may nevertheless have different implications for
taking actions to enhance the group’s status. It was hypothesized that the more women’s social identity
based on stereotypes was salient, the less likely they would be to take collective action. In contrast, the

more women’s social identity based on social experiences was salient, the more likely they would be to
take collective action.

Participants and Procedure
Women in undergraduate psychology courses at the University of North Dakota completed a 25-minute
questionnaire to partially fulfil their course requirement. Questionnaires were completed in groups of
5—15 (N = 140; Mean age = 23). The cultural background of this region tends to be homogeneous (Anglo
American (93%), African American (2%), Native American (2%), Hispanic (1%), Asian American (1%) and
Other (1%)).
Once the questionnaires were completed, students were given an oral and written debriefing regarding
the purpose of the study.

Materials

Social Identity
Consistent with self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), social identity was operationally defined
as a high meta-contrast ratio. In order to measure meta-contrast ratios, participants first indicated their
perceptions of ingroup and intergroup variability by rating how similar women are to each other and
how similar women and men are along five social experiences (being paid less than men for equal work;
feeling unsafe (e.g., walking along after dark); having to work harder than men to get ahead; having
fewer career opportunities than men; experience with sexual harassment) and six stereotyped traits
(nurturing; emotional; sensitive; yielding; understanding; and childlike). This list of traits and issues was
generated in a pilot study that asked university women to list any characteristic or experience they
believe is typical of/for women (Foster, 1995). Thus, the list used in the present study was considered by
the majority of that sample of university women to be relevant to their group. Responses were assessed
along a scale ranging from “not at all similar” (0) to “extremely similar” (4).
In order to compute the meta-contrast ratios for each item, scores on both measures of ingroup and
intergroup similarity were then recoded such that higher scores reflected higher perceptions of ingroup
and intergroup differences (Turner et al., 1987). These scores were then transformed by adding a
constant of 1, in order to avoid any division by zero in the calculation of meta-contrast ratios. From
these scores, a meta-contrast ratio was computed by dividing perceptions of intergroup differences by

perceptions of ingroup differences. Meta-contrast ratios greater than 1 reflected salient social identities
(Turner et al., 1987).

Collective Action
Based on a scale from Foster and Matheson (1995), participants indicated on a scale ranging from 0
(never participate) to 4 (always participate) how often they participate in a list of five behaviors during
their everyday life. Collective action was defined as any behavior directed at enhancing the group status
(Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). The five behaviors were private actions such as “I have gone out
of my way to collect information on women’s issues,” as well as increasingly more public actions such as
“I encourage friends to join organizations that deal with women’s issues”; “I talk about women’s issues
with family or friends, stressing the need to enhance women’s positions in society”;" I attend talks on
women’s issues”; “Whenever there is an organized protest, I attend the protest.”

Results

To ensure that social identities were indeed salient, a mean meta-contrast ratio was computed for both
the stereotype and social experience identities. Both overall meta-contrast ratios were greater than 1,
indicating salient social identities. The overall meta-contrast ratio for social experiences (M = 2.1, SD =
.78) was significantly larger than the overall meta-contrast ratio for stereotypes (M =1.34, SD = .47),
t(133) = 10.74, p < .001. To test the relationships among latent variables, structural equation mode ling
was used. Assessment of fit was based on several indices. Although the x2 statistic tests how well the
hypothesized model data fits the observed data, it does not tend to be accurate in small samples
(Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Byrne, 1989). Thus, researchers suggest that the x2 be reported, but that it not
be used as the primary index of goodness of fit (Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995).
Instead, alternative indices of fit are utilized in structural equation mode ling. First, the average offdiagonal residuals were examined, which represent the average amount of correlation between the
hypothesized and observed data that is unexplained by the model. If residuals are small, the model is
considered to exhibit good fit of the data (Hu & Bentler, 1995). A second criterion is the Comparative Fit
Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) which ranges from 0 to 1.00, with values of.90 indicating adequate fit of the
data (Byrne, 1994; Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995) and values of.93 or greater indicating a
well-fitting mode l (Byrne, 1994a). A third criterion is the goodness of fit index (GFI; Tanaka & Huba,
1989) which represents the proportion of variance in the observed data accounted for by the
hypothesized model. The mode ls were tested using EQS, a statistical package designed to test structural
mode ls (Bentler & Wu, 1995). Maximum likelihood estimation, with the Satorra-Bentler Scaled Statistic
correction was used due to small sample size (Byrne, 1994b; Hu & Bentler, 1995).

The first step in testing the model was to ensure that the measurement mode ls, that is, the variables
measuring each of the latent variables, adequately measured the factors they were designed to assess
(Byrne, 1989). Thus, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the fit for each latent
variable (social identities along social experiences and stereotypes, and collective action). These
measurement models were specified such that each factor could be explained by the indicator variables
designed to measure it, and the error terms would be uncorrelated. As Table I indicates, all indices for
the measurement models suggested that the variables were good estimates of the latent variables they
were designed to measure. In particular, residuals were low, suggesting good fit of the data. The CFI
values ranged between .94 and 1.0, indicating very good fit of the data, and the GFI values ranged from
.96 to .99 suggesting the hypothesized measurement mode ls account for a high proportion of variance
in the observed data.
Given that the measurement models were stable, a structural mode l was then specified, hypothesizing
that the more women’s social identity was salient along stereotypes the less collective action they
would take, while the more salient women’s social identity was along social experiences the more they
would take collective action. As Table I indicates, the residuals for the full model were small (.06),
indicating good fit of the data. The CFI was .94, indicating a well-fitting mode l, and the GFI suggested
the hypothesized mode l accounted for 86% of the variability in the observed data. Taken together,
these indices suggest the hypothesized model provides good fit of the data. As hypothesized, the
direction of path coefficients indicates that stronger social identities along stereotypes was associated
with less collective action, while stronger social identities along social experiences was associated with
greater participation in collective action.

Table I. Summary of Test Statistics for Measurement and Full Structural Model

Measurement Models

x2

df

Residuals

CFI

GFI

Social experiences

9.15

5

.04

.94

.97

Stereotypes

6.31 a

9

.04

1.0

.96

Collective action

1.16a

5

.01

1.0

.99

Full model

133.33

101

.06

.94

.86

a

Refers to a x2 > .05, indicating that there are no significant differences between the hypothesized and
observed data.

Discussion

The present study found support for the hypothesis that the more women’s social identity defined along
social experiences was salient, the more they participated in collective action. Also as expected, the
more women’s social identity defined along stereotypes was salient, the less they participated in
collective action. This suggests that while two social identities, both based on gender, may indeed be
salient, they appear to have different consequences for responding to discrimination. This may be
because a salient social identity defined along social experiences is qualitatively different than one
defined along stereotypes. This explanation is consistent with group consciousness theories (e.g.,
Dreifus, 1973) which suggest that defining women along shared experiences is more likely to result in
challenging the status quo then is an identity that is based on traditional stereotypes. However, it is
important to note that the meta-contrast ratio along social experiences was higher than along
stereotypes, suggesting that it was more salient to women than a social identity based on stereotypes.
In other words, women were more strongly identified with the shared experience identity. It could
therefore be argued that the relationship between a social identity based on social experiences and
collective action occurred simply because it was a stronger social identity. This explanation would
support self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), which states that the salience of personal and
social selves, as well as the occurrence of individual versus group behaviors lie on a continuum. As such,

the more an identity progresses toward the “social side” of the continuum, the more likely grouporiented behaviors and the less likely individual behaviors will occur.
A second experimental study was therefore designed to address this issue. In an experimental paradigm,
the degree of salience could be kept constant across the different identities, and as such any differe ntial
effects of collective action could be attributed to their qualitative difference.

STUDY 2

Rationale

According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), the more salient one’s social identity is, the
more likely it is that the individual will perform group-oriented behaviors. In contrast, group
consciousness theories (e.g., Bartky, 1977) would suggest that it not the degree of salience of a social
identity that predicts action, but the content of the identity. Specifically, these theories would suggest
that given groups of women with equally salient social identities, a social identity based on stereotypes
would not promote collective action to the same extent as a social identity based on social experience.
Instead, women with a salient social identity defined along stereotypes may be more likely to take
individual actions against the discrimination. While this is inconsistent with self-categorization theory
which would suggest that any salient social identity should be related to group rather than individual
behavior, it is indeed consistent with the five stage model of intergroup relations (Taylor & McKirnan,
1984). The five stage model suggests than when minority group members are ascribing to an
“individualistic ideology” such that they blame their individual efforts and ability for not succeeding,
they proceed with individualistic responses (Taylor & McKirnan, 1984). Thus, despite having a salient
social identity, defining the social self along intrinsic traits may be less to promote actions to enhance
women’s status, but more likely to promote individual actions than a social identity based on social
experiences. Study 2 therefore examined women’s individual and collective responses to discrimination
as a function of their social identity.

Method

Participants
Female (N = 60; Mean age = 22) introductory psychology students were contacted by phone and asked
to participate in a study explained to the m as an investigation of how to reduce test-taking anxiety.
Participants were told they would receive an experimental credit and were eligible for a $100 lottery.
Past research has indicated that women are more likely to believe deceptions about discrimination if
men are present in the experiment (Foster, Matheson & Poole, 1994). Therefore, while men were
included in each of the sessions for the purpose of enhancing experimental realism, they were not
included in the analyses. The men were nevertheless eligible for the lottery and fully debriefed.

Procedure
Participants entered the lab in groups of 5 to 10, and were first given an overview of what the
experiment would entail. Specifically, they were told that this was a study on how to reduce test-taking
anxiety. In order to do this they would be divided into groups based on their performance on a task.
Those who do well on the task would be asked to contribute to a video on test-taking anxiety designed
for new students and would also be eligible for a $100 lottery. Those who did not perform well on the
task would be asked to perform alternative tasks to assess whether anxiety-related performance
generalizes across tasks and would only be eligible for a $10 lottery. The purpose of these group
delineations was to establish a desirable and undesirable group status, thus motivating participants to
want to be perform well in order to enter the high status group (video/$100 lottery).
More specific instructions then given to participants varied depending on the type of social identity that
would be portrayed. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two social identity conditions. In the
stereotype condition, participants were told that anxiety in test-taking was associated with personality
traits. They were told that one trait, namely “intellectualizing” has been instrumental in understanding
anxiety in test-taking. The relationship between the traits and test-taking was further explained to them
such that low intellectualizers, as people who pay attention to their feelings, may let these feelings
overwhelm them in test-taking situations and therefore perform poorly. In contrast, high
intellectualizers were described as people who conquer fear by gathering information and problemsolving, and therefore may perform well.
In the social experience condition, participants were told that anxiety in test-taking was associated with
past educational opportunities. They were told that children generally receive either low (e.g., lack of
resources and choice of courses) or high (e.g., ample resources and choice of courses) educational
opportunities as they progress through school. They were further told that those with low educational
opportunities were not given enough resources to enable the m to by-pass the anxiety and therefore
perform poorly. In contrast, those with high educational opportunities likely were given enough

resources enabling them to by-pass the anxiety of test-taking, and therefore perform better than those
who have received low educational opportunities.2i
In order to induce a social identity consistent with the definition provided by self-categorization theory
(Turner et al., 1987), a high meta-contrast ratio (greater intergroup than ingroup differences) was
portrayed for each condition. Participants in the stereotype condition read that the intellectualizing trait
is associated with gender. That is, research shows that women are more likely to be
low intellectualizers and men are more likely to be high intellectualizers. For example,
most women follow their gut feelings, while most men are likely to analyze a
situation.

Participants in the social experience condition read that educational opportunities
are associated with gender. That is, research shows that women are more likely to
receive low educational opportunities and men are more likely to received high
educational opportunities. For example, most female students are not called upon as
often by teachers, while most men receive greater encouragement and feedback from
teachers.

In order to make salient the potential for discrimination based on their social identity, participants
further read that their identity (stereotype or educational opportunities) could be associated with
discrimination against entry into the high performance group. In particular, participants in the
stereotype condition read that it is possible that gender differences in personality traits may also affect
how people take tests. Because women in general have been found to exhibit the low intellectualizing
trait, their anxiety may interfere and reduce their test scores and therefore may not enter the video
group. In contrast, because men have been found to exhibit the high intellectualizing trait, anxiety may
not affect their scores and they may be more likely to enter the video group.
Participants in the social experience condition read that
It is possible that gender differences in educational opportunities may also affect how
people take tests. Because women in general have been found to receive low
educational opportunities, their anxiety may interfere and reduce their test scores
and therefore may not enter the video group. In contrast, because men have been
found to receive high educational opportunities, anxiety may not affect their scores
and they may be more likely to enter the video group.

In order to further enhance the salience of social identities, a variation2 of the minimal group paradigm
was then used to categorize participants into the stereotype or social experience condition. This
paradigm has consistently been successful in the induction of salient social identities (e.g., Brewer,
1979). In particular, participants in all conditions were given a personalized test booklet. They were told
that the experimenters had already assessed their personality type (or past educational experiences) in
a mass testing session in which all subjects had participated. Based on these results, their own group
membership was written inside the booklet which they were then given. Unbeknownst to participants at
this time, only the women were categorized as belonging to the low intellectualizing or low educational
opportunity conditions, while all of the men were categorized as belonging to the high intellectualizing
or high educational opportunity conditions. This was done to provide the basis for the subsequent sex
discrimination.
Once participants had been categorized into the personality or educational opportunity groups, they
were subjected to a situation of discrimination. This situation of discrimination was based on a paradigm
designed to simulate a meritocratic situation (Foster, Matheson & Poole, 1994; Wright, Taylor &
Moghaddam, 1990). In particular, participants were told that in order to assess how their personality or
educational opportunities might be related to test performance, they would complete a task that often
appears on standardized language placement tests. They would be given a list of 10 stimulus words to
use as the basis for writing a paragraph that is creative, logical and succinct. They would be given 5
minutes. After completion of their paragraphs, their scores would be assessed by the experimenter
using the criteria that testing agencies had presumably provided. Allegedly, only the highest scoring
participants would then be selected for the high performance group to participate in a second part of
the experiment. The remaining participants would be relegated to the low performance group.
The activities of the high and low performance group were then explained in detail. To reflect a
meritocratic organizational context, the methodological goal was to establish a group that participants
would aspire to be in and inclusion would reflect personal success and high social value. The second
group should represent a lack of success and low social value. This differential evaluation of the two
groups was achieved by varying the mundane ness of the task and the rewards associated with the work
performed. Supposedly, the high performance group would be asked to provide us with some ideas
about how to develop a video for students that might help them overcome the anxiety associated with
test-taking, thus their skills were valued by the experimenters. They were told they would do this in a
different experimental room, where refreshments would be served and that they would be eligible for a
$100 lottery. In contrast, the low performance group would continue to complete a series of tests that
would assess whether their performance generalizes to other types of skills such as math. Also, they
would only be eligible for a $10 lottery. Thus, their continuation in the experiment would be tedious,
and their skills less valued by the experimenter. In reality, the task and scoring were bogus, and all
participants were eligible for the $100 lottery.
To make the potential for discrimination salient, participants were then warned that scoring for the
group assignments tends to discriminate against the low intellectualizers (or those with low educational
opportunities), in that it was more often the high intellectualizers (or those with high educational
opportunities) who scored higher. They were told that out of a possible 10 points, a passing score was 5.

Participants were given 5 minutes to complete their paragraphs, which were then collected and
ostensibly scored. To further enhance the salience of the social identities, the experimenter then
provided participants with “false” feedback about their scores on the task by writing the individual
scores in each booklet and the scores for each group on the blackboard. The distribution of scores
reflected a high meta-contrast ratio. In particular, participants saw that low intellectualizers (or those
with low educational opportunities) received a limited range of scores, all below the passing score (e.g.,
2.5, 2, 1.5), while high intellectualizers received a limited range of scores, all well above the passing
score (e.g., 8, 8.5, 9). This pattern of scores was made explicit with the following explanation:
As the scores indicate, the low intellectualizers (or low educational opportunity)
group members seem to score around the same range, and none of them were able
to pass. This means they will have to complete more tasks, and as well, are ineligible
for the $100 lottery. In contrast, it appears that the high intellectualizers (or high
educational opportunity) group members had higher scores on average. This means
they were able to pass and will help us develop the video, as well as being eligible for
the $100 lottery.
Participants were then given their personal booklets to examine their scores. Those in the high
intellectualizing or educational opportunity groups were asked to follow the experimenter to a different
room where they would presumably participate in the video development. At this point it became clear
to participants, that consistent with original cover story, only men received the necessary passing score,
and therefore left the room with the experimenter. Thus, the effects of discrimination on the basis of
gender were now explicit. After the men had left, a research assistant asked the female participants to
complete a questionnaire presumably designed to assess their opinions on the use of the task and told
that the alleged second part of the experiment would follow the questionnaire. The questionnaire
contained the manipulation checks and measures of responses to discrimination. Once they had
completed the questionnaire, they were told that this was the end of the experiment, and they were
debriefed.

Materials

Manipulation Checks. To assess whether participants in each condition perceived the social identity that
was portrayed, two questions assessed perceptions of ingroup and intergroup variability. Perceptions of
ingroup variability were assessed by asking participants to indicate how similar women are in terms of
the trait intellectualizing (or the experience of limited educational opportunities). Responses were
assessed using a scale ranging from “not at all similar” (0) to “extremely similar” (10). Using the same
scale, perceptions of intergroup variability were assessed by having participants indicate how similar

men and women are on the trait, intellectualizing (or the educational opportunities women and men
receive). Meta-contrast ratios were then calculated as they were in Study 1.
To assess whether participants recognized the discrimination that was portrayed, they were asked to
indicate on a scale ranging from “not at all” (0) to “extremely” (10), how much does this task
discriminate against your gender, and how much does this task discriminate against the group to which
you were assigned.
Actions. Measures of responses to discrimination were adapted from Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam
(1990). Using a scale ranging from “extremely unlikely to participate” (-3) to “extremely likely to
participate “ (3), participants indicated the extent to which they would participate in each of five
behaviors given the opportunity to respond to their treatment in the present experiment. Items
included, “accept the situation, that is, your assignment to either group, as is”; “request an individual
retest of your score”; “confront the experimenter and demand an explanation of your particular group
assignment”; “Ask that the group be retested on their scores”; “get together with other students to
confront the experimenter, demanding an explanation for your group assignment.” The two individual
behaviors were combined to assess individual actions (i.e., actions aimed at enhancing one’s individual
status), r = .55, p < .01 and the two group behaviors were combined to assess collective action (i.e.,
actions aimed at enhancing group status), r = .76, p < .01.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

If the inductions of a salient social identity were successful, then participants should report metacontrast ratios greater than 1, which indicate that participants perceived higher intergroup than ingroup
differences. As well, meta-contrast ratios should be the same across the conditions so that no group had
a more salient social identity than the other. T-tests indicated that participants in both the stereotype
(M = 1.36, SD = .55) and the social experience conditions (M = 1.25, SD = .37) reported meta-contrast
ratios greater than 1, indicating a salient social identity. Further, the degree of salience was equal across
groups, t(58) = .937, ns.
T-tests were also performed to assess whether participants recognized they were being discriminated
against. Participants in both the stereotype (M = 6.33, SD = 2.82) and the social experience conditions
(M = 6.33, SD = 2.56) believed the task discriminated against their gender, and the degree of
discrimination perceived was equal across groups, t(58) = .000, ns. In addition, participants in both the
stereotype (M = 6.70, SD = 2.80) and the social experience conditions (M = 6.73, SD = 2.61) believed the
task discriminated against their group to which they were assigned, and the degree of discrimination
perceived was equal across groups, t(58) = -.048, ns.

Actions

A one-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed to assess the effect of type of social identity
(stereotype and social experience) on three dependent variable s: acceptance, individual and collective
actions. Significant differences were found across the types of social identity on the dependent
variables, Wilks’ L = .84, F(3,56) = 3.65, p < .01. The multivariate effect size was .16. Univariate F tests
indicated significant differences across the groups on individual actions, F(1,58) = 8.84, p < .01, h2 = .13
as well as the collective actions, F(1,58) = 7.55, p < .01, h = .12 such that women with a social identity
based on social experiences endorsed greater individual and collective action than women with a social
identity based on stereotypes (see Table II). There were no significant differences between the groups
on acceptance, F(1,58) = .001, ns.

Discussion

It was expected that women who defined their identity along a social experience would endorse greater
collective action than women who defined their social identity along stereotypes. Consistent with Study
1, a social identity based on a social experience led to greater collective action than a social identity
based on a stereotype. Given the degree of salience of the social identities was the same, it appears to
be the content of a social identity rather than its level of salience that has implications for responding to
discrimination.

Table II. Means and Standard Deviations for Each Social Identity on Action
Type of Social Identity

Social
Stereotype

Experience

M

SD

M

SD

Acceptance

3.90

3.84

3.87

3.09

Individual

2.93

2.83

5.20

3.06

Collective

2.70

3.35

5.06

3.35

It was also expected that women who defined their social identity along stereotypes would participate
in greater individual actions than women whose social identity was defined along social experiences.
Contrary to expectations however, women who defined their social identity along stereotypes were less
likely to endorse individual action then women who defined their social identity along social
experiences. Thus, a social identity defined along stereotypes appears to promote greater acceptance of
the status quo than a social identity defined along social experiences. While there were no significant
differences on the acceptance variable between the two social identities, the mean scores for individual
actions, as well as collective actions were below the midpoint, suggesting endorsement of inactivity.
Therefore, while women who defined their social identity along stereotypes did not appear to accept
their discrimination more, they indeed endorsed greater non-response to discrimination than women
whose identity was defined along social experiences. This may suggest a need for those women to “save
face,” as was found in Lalonde and Silverman (1994). That is, participants may not have wanted to
indicate blatant acceptance of their situation. However, despite recognizing that discrimination was
occurring, their lack of endorsement of action compared to women whose identity was defined along
social experiences suggests they would choose to accept rather than try to change how they were
treated.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Taken together, these studies suggest that a social identity along stereotypes appears to promote an
acceptance of the status quo, while a social identity along social experiences appears to promote a
desire to change the status quo, both at the individual and collective levels. Group consciousness
theories (e.g., Bartky, 1977) would suggest that this is due to the fact that a salient social identity
defined along social experiences is a qualitatively different experience than a salient social identity along
stereotypes. Originally, feminist consciousness-raising groups promoted a social identity for women
based on external experiences to make apparent to women how their personal experiences were
connected to the group’s experiences i.e., “the personal is political” (Carey, 1980; Dreifus, 1973). It may

therefore be that if women are defining their group identity along external factors, then a greater
connection to their social group and its political experiences may have become apparent. If a woman
defines her social group along external characteristics, then when she encounters a situation of social
discrimination she will likely externalize the blame (e.g., Foster, Matheson & Poole, 1994) to systemic
discrimination. The system therefore becomes more relevant to her personal experience and
participation in group-oriented behavior such as collective action may seem more important and
worthwhile to enhancing individual status. Thus, defining one’s social group along social experiences
may promote a connection between the individual and the system, and therefore, action to change the
system becomes more likely.
In contrast, a social identity based on stereotypes may not make this connection as apparent. Past
research has shown that when the group is defined along intrinsic stereotyped traits, personal blame for
discrimination has become accentuated (Jensen & Gutek, 1982; Foster, Matheson & Poole, 1993; Neto,
1995). The system may therefore seem less relevant to a woman’s life given she is less likely to
recognize how the system has created and maintained barriers in her life. If the individual rather than
the system is viewed as the source of the problem, responding to systemic discrimination may be
unlikely. Thus, a qualitative difference between a social identity defined along social experiences and
stereotypes may be the understanding of how the system impacts the individual.
This connection between the individual and the social group has also been referred to by selfcategorization theory. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) refers to “depersonalization”
which occurs when an individuals’ social self becomes salient to such an extent that they view
themselves as an “interchangeable exemplar” of their ingroup (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). In other
words, the individual is her/his group. However, self-categorization theory has not focused on the
factors involved in developing this connection between the self and the social group: it “has little to say
that is distinctive about the internalization of preformed ingroup-outgroup categorization,” suggesting
that people may internalize their social groups through the traditional processes of attitude change or
persuasion (Turner, 1985, p. 101). Thus, self-categorization theory distinguishes between a salient social
identity and depersonalization; one’s group membership can be salient, but not necessarily internalized
into one’s personal identity. For example, a woman who experiences discrimination may recognize that
gender discrimination occurs (salient social identity), but may not have internalized this social identity
into her personal identity. Indeed, the robustness of the “personal /group discrimination discrepancy”
(e.g., Crosby, 1984; Taylor et al., 1990) whereby minority group members recognize greater group than
personal discrimination suggests that while a salient social identity may be common, depersonalization
may be rare. It may be that one route toward depersonalization is redefining social identity to reflect
external factors versus internal characteristics.
It is therefore important for researchers to examine how their theoretical and operational definitions
may serve to reflect and maintain dominant ideologies. Ironically, a social identity may serve to keep the
social group distinct from the experience of the individual by accentuating self-blame for gender
discrimination, if it is defined in terms stereotypes. If women blame themselves, then acting against a
problem that is self-de fined may be an unlikely response, and as such, discrimination is maintained.
Consequently, women become participants in their oppression. By examining theories based in the grass

roots experiences of groups trying to undermine the status quo, insight may be gained into how
alternative definitions of social identity may help to reduce this oppression.

REFERENCES

Bartky, S. L. (1977). Toward a phenomenology of feminist consciousness. In M. Vetterling-Braggin, F.
Elliston, & J. English (Eds.), Feminism and philosophy. Totawa, NJ: Littlefield. Bentler, P. M. (1990).
Comparative fit indices in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 238—246.
Bentler, P. M., & Bonnett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness-of-fit in the analysis of
covariances structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588—606.
Bentler, P. M., & Wu, E. J. C. (1995). EQS for windows user’s guide. Encino, CA: Multivariate Software,
Inc.
Bowles, G., & Duelli Klein, R. (1983). Theories of women’s studies. London: Routledge.
Brewer, M. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307—324.
Byrne, B. M. (1989). A primer of LISREL: Basic applications and programming for confirmatory factor
analytic models. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Byrne, B. M. (1994a). Testing for the factorial validity, replication, and invariance of a measuring
instrument: A paradigmatic application based on the Maslach Burnout Inventory. Multivariate
Behavioral Research, 29, 289—311.
Byrne, B. M. (1994b). Structural equation modeling with EQS and EQS/Windows. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Care y, P. (1980). Personal is political. Canadian Women’s Studies, 2, 4—7.
Crosby, F. J. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. Psychological Review, 83, 85—113.
Crosby, F. J. (1984). The denial of personal discrimination. American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 371—386.
Driefus, C. (1973). Women’s fate: Rap from a feminist consciousness-raising group. New York: Bantam.
Foster, M. D., & Matheson, K. (1995). Double relative deprivation: Combining the personal and political.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1167—1177.

Foster, M. D., & Matheson, K. (1998). Perceiving and feeling personal discrimination: Motivation or
Inhibition for social action. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 1, 165—174.
Foster, M. D., Matheson, K., & Poole, M. (1994). Responding to sexual discrimination: The effects of
societal versus self-blame. Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 743—754.
Friedman, D., & McAdam, D. (1992). Networks, choices and the life of a social movement. In A. D. Morris
& C. McClurg Mueller (Eds.), Frontiers in social movement theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Gamson, W. A. (1992). The social psychology of collective action. In A. D. Morris, & C. McClurg Mueller
(Eds.), Frontiers in social movement theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Intergroup behaviour, self-stereotyping and the salience of social
categories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 325—340.
Hoyle, R. H., & Panter, A. T. (1995). Writing about structural equation models. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.),
Structural equation modeling: Concepts, issues and applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1995). Evaluating model fit. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.),
Structural equation modeling: Concepts, issues and applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Jensen, I. W., & Gutek, B. A. (1982). Attributions and assignment of responsibility in sexual harassment.
Journal of Social Issues, 38, 121—136.
Lalonde, R. N., & Silverman, R. A. (1994). Behavioral preferences in response to social injustice: The
effects of group permeability and social identity salience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
66, 78—85.
Lee, Y. T. (1992). Ingroup preference and similarities among African American and Chinese American
Studies. Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 225—235.
Neto, F. (1995). Knowledge of sex stereotypes and internality. Psychological Reports, 76, 504—506.
Oakes, P. J., & Turner, J. C. (1990). Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social
stereotyping? In W. Stroeb & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology: Vol. 1.
Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality
in twentieth century England. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Stanley, L., & Wise, S. (1983). Breaking out: Feminist consciousness and feminist research. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Stephan, W. G. (1977). Cognitive differentiation in intergroup perception. Sociometry, 40, 50—58.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup
behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149—178.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin &s. Worchel
(Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Tanaka, J. S., & Huba, G. J. (1989). A general coefficient of determination for covariance structure
models under arbitrary GLS estimation. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 42,
233—239.
Taylor, D. M., & McKirnan, D. J. (1984). A five-stage model of intergroup relations. British Journal of
Social Psychology, 23, 291—300.
Taylor, D. M., Wright, S. C., Moghaddam, F. M., & Lalonde, R. N. (1990). The personal/ group
discrimination discrepancy: Perceiving my group, but not myself, to be a target for discrimination.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 254—263.
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group
behavior. Advances in Group Processes, 2, 77—121.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M.S. (1987). Rediscovering the social
group: A theory of self-categorization. New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Turner, J. C., & Oakes, P. J. (1986). The significance of the social identity concept for social psychology
with reference to individualism, interactionism, and social influence. British Journal of Social Psychology,
25, 237—252.
Turner, J. C., & Oakes, P. J. (1989). Self-categorization theory and social influence. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.),
The psychology of group influence. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J. Haslam, A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social
context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454—463.
Wilkinson, N., & Schneider, M. (1990). The development of a feminist consciousness in women: work in
progress. Paper presented at the Canadian Psychological Association Annual Conference, Ottawa,
Canada.
Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990). Responding to membership in a disadvantaged
group: From acceptance to collective protest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 994—
1003.

i

In order to ensure that “low intellectualizing” was considered to by women to be part of a the female
stereotype, and that having limited educational opportunities was an typical experience for women,

pilot research was conducted. Participants were asked and indicated that they believed low
intellectualizing was “a typical trait found in women in North America” and that limited educational
opportunities “was a typical experience for women in North America.”

2

Two criteria for the minimal group paradigm were changed (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971).
First, Tajfel et al. (1987) suggested that no face-to-face interaction among participants occur. This was
changed such that participants were seated around a table in visual contact with each other. The second
criterion was participants be unaware of other participants’ group membership. This was changed such
that group membership remained anonymous until participants were subjected to discrimination. At
that time, it became clear to all participants that the men had been categorized into the high status
group and the women had been categorized into the low status group. Because the present experiment
also involved an induction of a situation of discrimination in terms of gender, it was necessary for
participants to be aware that entry into the high status group was based on being male. Thus it was
necessary for group membership to be made apparent in order to induce perceptions of intergroup
differences. Moreover, this paradigm more closely mimics how natural social groups are categorized in
that membership in race and sex groups are visible rather than anonymous.

